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Abstract
To protect themselves from attacks, networks need to enforce
ingress filtering, i.e., block inbound packets sent from spoofed
IP addresses. Despite the importance of filtering spoofed packets
and understanding the prevalence of the phenomenon, the exist-
ing studies do not allow to infer the extent of ingress filtering
at Internet-scale, providing results with only a limited coverage
of the Internet networks: they can either measure networks that
operate servers with faulty network-stack implementations, or
require installation of the measurement software on volunteer net-
works, or assume specific properties, like traceroute loops, which
are challenging to reproduce in practice. Improving coverage of
the spoofing measurements is critical.
In this work we present the Spoofing Mapper (SMap): the
first scanner for performing Internet-wide studies of enforcement
of ingress filtering. The SMap measurement methodology utilises
standard protocols’ behaviour that are present in almost any In-
ternet network. SMap not only provides better coverage of the
Internet ingress-filtering measurements in contrast to previous
studies, but it is also more effective than the previous approaches.
We applied SMap for Internet-wide measurements of ingress
filtering: we found that 21% of all the Autonomous Systems
(ASes) in the Internet do not filter spoofed packets, in contrast
to 2.5% ASes identified by the most recent study with volun-
teers (of the Spoofer Project), as well as 13173 new spoofable
ASes, which were not detected by the other tools. Our study with
SMap provides the most comprehensive view of ingress filtering
deployment in the Internet and remediation in filtering spoofed
packets over a period of six months until February 2020. SMap
is simple to use and does not require installation on the tested
network nor coordination with the tested networks.
We set up a web service at http://to_be_revealed/ which
reports statistics from SMap evaluations and enables continual
Internet-wide data collection, its analysis and reporting of the
statistics to the web page. We also make our datasets as well
as the SMap tool publicly available to enable researchers to
reproduce and validate the results.
1 Introduction
Source IP address spoofing allows attackers to generate and
send packets with a false source IP address impersonating other
Internet hosts. Source IP spoofing is employed by the attackers,
e.g., for avoiding detection and filtering of attack sources, for
reflecting attack traffic, for DNS cache poisoning, for triggering
services which can only be accessible to internal users. The
best way to prevent IP spoofing is by enforcing Source Address
Validation (SAV) on packets, a practice standardised in 2000 as
BCP38 [13]: ingress filtering for blocking inbound packets with
spoofed IP addresses and egress filtering for blocking outbound
packets sent from spoofed IP addresses.
The idea underlying ingress filtering is that the source address
of a packet should be checked against a set of permitted addresses
before letting it into the network. Otherwise, the attackers using
spoofed IP addresses belonging to the network can trigger and
exploit internal services which are otherwise not accessible to
external IP addresses, such as RPC. Enforcing ingress filtering
is therefore critical for protecting the networks and the internal
hosts against attacks.
Despite awareness to the risks and efforts to prevent IP spoof-
ing, it is still a significant problem and attacks utilising IP spoof-
ing remain widespread [6, 8, 14, 24, 26, 27]. There are significant
research and operational efforts to understand the extent and
the scope of (ingress and egress)-filtering enforcement and to
characterise the networks which do not filter spoofed packets;
we discuss these in Related Work, Section 2. Although the ex-
isting studies and tools, such as the Open Resolver Project [23]
or the Spoofer Project [3–5, 18, 20], provide a valuable contri-
bution for inferring networks which do not enforce spoofing,
they are nevertheless insufficient: they provide a meager (often
non-uniform) coverage of the Internet networks and are limited
in their applicability as well as effectiveness.
In this work we present the first Internet-scale scanner for
ingress filtering, we call the Spoofing Mapper (SMap), and ap-
ply it for evaluation of filtering of spoofed packets in the Internet.
SMap is a network scanner specifically designed for performing
comprehensive Internet-wide measurements of ingress filtering.
In contrast to previous excellent studies of ingress filtering, which
however are limited to a small set of networks, SMap enables
scans of the entire Internet address space, measuring networks
which do not filter inbound spoofed packets.
In this work we apply SMap for scanning ingress-filtering
in networks operating more than 3M popular domains, hosted
in more than 46% of the Autonomous Systems (ASes) in the
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Internet. The measurements with SMap found that more than
45% of the tested ASes do not enforce ingress filtering (i.e.,
21% of all the ASes in the routing system), in contrast to 2.5%
identified by the latest measurement of the Spoofer Project [20].
Limitations of Filtering Studies
The measurement community provided indispensable studies for
assessing “spoofability” in the Internet, and has had huge suc-
cess in detecting the ability to spoof in some individual networks
using active measurements, e.g., via agents installed on those
networks [18,23], or by identifying spoofed packets using offline
analysis of traffic, e.g., [19, 20]. These studies however provide
a limited and non-uniform coverage of the Internet. Carrying out
measurements of spoofability in the global Internet is challeng-
ing. The key concerns for conducting Internet measurements,
upon which conclusions can be drawn, are scalable measurement
infrastructure, good coverage of the Internet and a representa-
tive selection of measurement’s vantage points. We next list the
limitations of the existing studies:
Limited coverage. Previous studies infer spoofability infor-
mation based on a limited set of networks. For instance, net-
works that operate servers with faulty network stack [16] or
networks with volunteers that execute the measurement soft-
ware [3–5, 18, 20, 23], or networks that agree to cooperate and
volunteer their traffic logs for offline analysis, e.g., [20].
Non-representative Internet measurements. Volunteer or
crowd-sourcing studies, such as the Spoofer Project [18], are
inherently limited due to bias introduced by the participants.
These measurements are performed using a limited number of
vantage points in specific networks, and hence are often not
representative of the entire Internet. Increasing the coverage
and selecting the networks more uniformly is imperative for
collecting representative data - [15] showed that the measured
network can significantly influence the resulting data as well as
the derived conclusions.
Unstable measurement infrastructure. Current measure-
ment studies use unstable infrastructures: volunteers running
agents can reinstall computers or move to other networks; mis-
configured servers (e.g., with open resolution or with faulty net-
work stack) can be updated – all causing the network to “disap-
pear from the radar” although it may still be spoofable. Hence,
longitudinal studies, such as the Spoofer Project, are biased by the
stability of the vantage points, and do not allow accurate tracking
of deployment of ingress filtering in individual networks.
SMap: The Spoofing Mapper
SMap performs active black-box measurements of ingress fil-
tering using standard protocols and protocols’ behaviour in the
tested networks. SMap does not require any coordination with
the tested networks, nor installation of any software. SMap re-
ceives a list of networks, and performs ingress filtering scans
by exchanging packets with the tested networks and inferring
spoofability based on the packets arriving from the tested net-
works. SMap does not require vantage points in the tested net-
works nor misconfigured servers, SMap infrastructure can be
Figure 1: SMap measurements between July’19 and February’20.
setup in one location, see components in Figure 5. In this work
we developed scan techniques based on three protocols: DNS,
PMTUD and IPID, which can run over TCP, UDP and ICMP, and
applied them for Internet-scale measurements of ingress filtering.
These protocols are widely supported by the TCP/IP networks
in the Internet. Furthermore, the modular architecture of SMap
allows easy integration of new protocols and techniques in the
future.
Using standard protocols’ behaviour provides better stability
of the test infrastructure, since, in contrast to [18, 23] we do not
risk volunteers moving to other networks or formatting their
hosts, nor misconfigured servers being patched. The servers that
we use in our measurements can be moved to different IP ad-
dresses, this however makes no difference for our data collected
with SMap, since the new IP addresses of the servers can be
retrieved with DNS requests or by scanning. Therefore, once
we have a test server in a network we typically do not lose a
measurement point in that network. Higher stability also allows
for more accurate reproduction and validation of our datasets
and results, and enables to perform reliable longitudinal studies.
Ingress filtering measurements with SMap plotted in Figure 1,
since its inception between 10 July 2019 and 10 February 2020,
demonstrate that the number of spoofable ASes is stable and
proportionally increases with the growth in the number of ASes.
SMap enables running Internet-wide scans of ingress filtering
by probing large portions of the address space (as well as the
entire address space). Such scans have proven to be a valuable
methodology for security research and operational communities.
Internet-wide scans provide better understanding of deployment
of best practices and of vulnerabilities. SMap breaks the current
barrier of the existing tools, enabling scanning the entire Internet
for ingress filtering.
Ethical Considerations
We devised a tool for Internet-wide scans of ingress filtering in
remote networks. Internet-wide scans are important for security
research [12,21] and have proven valuable in improving the secu-
rity landscape of the Internet, including exposing new vulnerabil-
ities, tracking adoption of defences. Nevertheless, Internet-wide
scans introduce also ethical challenges. We communicated with
network operators to understand and consider the ethical im-
plications of Internet-wide scans. We identified two issues as
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particularly important for our measurements: traffic load and
consent.
Traffic load. Network scans, such as [12, 16, 21], require ex-
changing packets with a large number of Internet networks as
well as IP addresses inside the networks. We develop a series
of measures in design of SMap to reduce the traffic load of our
scans on the Internet and on the measured networks. In addition
to supporting the mere scan of the IPv4 address range, we also
integrated support for domain-based scans - this allows testing
networks for ingress filtering without scanning them, hence re-
markably reducing the traffic volume. We explain this in Section
4. We further integrated large inter-scan delays to reduce the load
by spreading the measurements traffic over longer time periods.
Consent of the scanned. It is often impossible to request
permission from owners of all the tested networks in advance,
this challenge similarly applies to other Internet-wide studies
[11, 12, 16, 21]. Like the other studies, [11, 12], we provide an
option to opt out of our scans. To opt out the network has to
provide either its network block (in CIDR notation), domain or
ASN through the contact page at http://to_be_revealed/.
Performing security scans is important - the networks that do not
enforce filtering of spoofed packets pose a hazard not only to
their operators but also to their users, customers and services, as
well as other networks. Due to the importance of identifying such
networks, in their recent study [20] even make public the (“name-
and-shame”) lists of providers with missing or misconfigured
filtering of spoofed packets; [20] also discuss stronger measures
against spoofable networks, including liability for damages, and
various types of regulation. Inevitably, due to the risks that such
networks pose to the Internet ecosystem, it is of public interest to
know who those networks are. We do not make the identity of the
networks, that do not filter spoofed packets, publicly available,
but inform the general public on the fraction of such networks and
provide their characterisation (i.e., size, geo-location, business
type) in Section 6.
Undoubtedly, filtering spoofed packets is critical and networks
have to deploy best practices, such as BCP38 [13] and BCP84 [1],
to ensure security of the Internet ecosystem. Understanding the
extent of filtering is also significant for devising future policies,
defence mechanisms or estimating threats and risks to attacks.
Contributions
We propose a new approach for measuring ingress filtering in
the Internet, and developed methodologies which do not require
setting up vantage points, nor using misconfigured servers. We
built an Internet-wide scanner, SMap, based on these methodolo-
gies and experimentally validated its effectiveness over a period
of half a year by scanning networks hosting services from more
than 3M popular domains. These networks constitute more than
46% of Internet’s ASes. We report on the results of our mea-
surements and compare them to the datasets published by other
projects. We show that SMap provides not only much better
coverage of the Internet (even when performing domains-based
scans) but also a higher accuracy in identifying networks which
do not filter spoofed packets. Indeed, applying SMap to the same
ASes as projects [3,19] (the only ones which make their datasets
available), we found 13173 new ASes that do not enforce ingress
filtering.
Similarly to other studies, SMap can also have false negatives
(i.e., networks which do not enforce ingress filtering but are
not identified by SMap), but does not have false positives. We
discuss causes for false negatives and explain how to reduce them
by increasing the traffic volumes of the scans. In this work we
make the first step towards applying new approach for measuring
ingress filtering and perform validation of its effectiveness. We
leave it for future work to evaluate the tradeoffs between the
traffic volume vs the accuracy of the scans.
SMap can be used by researchers for obtaining information
on deployment of ingress filtering or as a service, e.g., by ISPs
or NSPs, to provide periodic information on ingress filtering
to their customers. Notifying networks about this periodically
would reduce the fraction of networks which do not enforce
ingress filtering.
We provide access to SMap, as well as to the datasets collected
by SMap and the statistics, at http://to_be_revealed/. The
website enables continuous and periodic collection and analysis
of the ingress filtering, performs analyses and provides the results
in form of plots and statistics.
Organisation
Our work is organised as follows: we compare our study and
SMap to related work in Section 2. In Section 3 we describe our
approach and the measurement methodology that we developed.
In Section 4 we present the design and the implementation of
SMap and the measurement techniques that it uses. In Section
5 we report on the data collected with SMap and the statistics
that we derived from it. We characterise the networks which we
found not to enforce ingress filtering in Section 6. We conclude
this work in Section 7.
2 Related Work
Studies on deployment of filtering spoofed packets in the Inter-
net can be grossly categorised as: using network traces or using
vantage points. Vantage points can be based on volunteers or on
faulty or misconfigured servers. Network traces can be collected
actively, e.g., with traceroutes, or by passively recording the traf-
fic, e.g., at IXP. We summarise the results of the previous studies
in Table 1, and briefly explain them next. Some of the studies
below measure ingress filtering, the others egress filtering. We
compare to both types of studies since they all are important for
ensuring security and stability of the Internet infrastructure and
there are large efforts to mitigate both problems.
Vantage Points (VP). Measurement of networks which do not
perform egress filtering of packets with spoofed IP addresses was
first presented by the Spoofer Project in 2005 [3]. The idea behind
the Spoofer Project is to craft packets with spoofed IP addresses
and check receipt thereof on the vantage points operated by
the volunteers, i.e., participants who run a “spoofer” software
provided by the authors. The code uses raw sockets to generate
UDP packets with spoofed source IP addresses sent to the hosts
operated by the volunteers. The spoofability is established by
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Study Coverage Spoofable Type Year Repetitive Reproducible
(scanned ASes) ASes
Spoofer Project [3] 202 of 18000 (1.1%) 52 VP 2005 3 7
Spoofer Project [5] 1586 of 44000 (3.6%) 390 VP 2013 3 7
Misconfigured servers [16] 2692 of 48000 (5.6%) 870 VP 2014 7 3
Traceroute [19] 1780 of 56000 (3.2%) 703 NT 2017 7 7
IXP traces [17] 700 of 56000 (1.3%) 393 NT 2017 7 7
Paid Spoofer Project [18] 784 of 56000 (1.4%) 48 VP 6w. in 2017 3 7
Spoofer Project [20] 5178 of 65689 (7.9%) 1631 VP 2019 3 7
SMap 30563 of 65689 (46.5%) 13780 - 2019-20 3 3
Table 1: Comparison between SMap and other studies.
measuring the fraction of arriving packets from the clients to the
measurement servers. Based on the data collected by the Spoofer
Project many reports were published providing statistics on the
deployment of egress filtering in the Internet [4, 5, 18, 20]; we
list the statistics in Table 1.
The downside of this approach is that the Spoofer Project
requires users to download, compile and execute a software -
which also needs administrative privileges to run - once per
measurement. This involves not only technically knowledgeable
volunteers that agree to run untrusted code, but also networks
which agree to operate such vantage points on their premises.
The failures of the Spoofer Project are mostly related to failures
to open raw sockets and send spoofed packets on some clients.
Although providing an optimal setup for spoofing measurements,
the vantage points provide a limited coverage of the Internet.
Furthermore, [15] argue that operators are unlikely to volunteer
or conduct measurements that could leak a negative security pos-
ture of their networks, including lack of support of BCP38 [13].
Hence, [15] propose that the most viable method to measure fil-
tering of spoofed packets in more networks is by crowd-sourcing.
In 2018 [18] performed a one-time study of the Spoofer Project
by renting a 2000 EUR crowd-sourcing platforms with work-
ers that executed the Spoofer software over a 6 weeks period.
Their measurements included additional 342 ASes which were
not covered by the Spoofer Project. Crowd-sourcing studies, in
addition to being expensive, are also limited by the networks in
which workers are present and do not provide longitudinal and
repetitive studies that can be validated and reproduced.
In a recent longitudinal data analysis by the Spoofer Project
[20] the authors observed that despite increase in the coverage of
ASes that do not perform ingress filtering in the Internet, the test
coverage across networks and geo-locations was non-uniform.
Closely related to volunteers is the vantage points measure-
ments with faulty or misconfigured servers. [23] noticed that
some DNS resolvers do not change the source IP addresses of
the DNS requests that they forward to upstream resolvers and
return the DNS responses using the IP addresses of the upstream
resolvers - a problem which the authors trace to broken net-
working implementations. [16] used this observation to measure
egress filtering in networks that operate such misconfigured DNS
resolvers. The idea is that the DNS resolver receives a request,
performs the resolution and sends a response but without chang-
ing the IP address of the response packet to its own address.
Since the response is sent from IP address which does not belong
to the AS on which the DNS server is located the authors con-
clude that the network does not perform egress filtering. Such
measurements are limited only to networks which operate DNS
servers with broken networking implementations: out of 225,888
networks that [16] measured, they could find such DNS servers
only in 870 networks.
Since the Open Resolver and the Spoofer Projects are the
only two infrastructures providing vantage points for measuring
spoofing - their importance is immense as they facilitated many
research works analysing the spoofability of networks based
on the datasets collected by these infrastructures. Nevertheless,
the studies using these infrastructure, e.g., [15, 20], point out
the problems with the representativeness of the collected data
of the larger Internet. Both projects (the Spoofer and the Open
Resolver) acknowledged the need to increase the coverage of
the measurements, as well as the challenges for obtaining better
coverage and stable vantage points.
Network Traces (NT). To overcome the dependency on van-
tage points for running the tests, researchers explored alternatives
for inferring filtering of spoofed packets. A recent work used
loops in traceroute to infer ability to send packets from spoofed
IP addresses, [19]. The idea is that if the traceroute leaves the
stub AS with the IP address of the vantage point initiating the
traceroute and reaches the upstream provider then the provider
does not perform ingress filtering. If the upstream provider’s bor-
der router performs filtering, it should block the traceroute packet
when it arrives from the stub AS, as the packet has a source ad-
dress not belonging to the stub AS. This method detects lack of
ingress filtering only on provider ASes (i.e., spoofable customer
ASes cannot be detected). The study in [19] identified loops in
1780 ASes, which is 3.2% of all the ASes, and 703 of the ASes
were found spoofable. Although a valuable complementary tech-
nique for active probes with vantage points, this approach has
significant limitations: in the absence of loops ingress filtering
cannot be inferred, alternately a forwarding loop in traceroute
does not imply absence of filtering at the edge, since a loop re-
sulting from a transient misconfiguration or routing update can
occur anywhere in the network. Therefore, to identify a lack of
ingress filtering reliably one needs to detect a border router and,
more importantly, the traceroute loops need to be reproduced
- a difficult problem in practice. Furthermore, reproducing or
validating the dataset after some time is virtually impossible as
the odds for failures rapidly increase. Running traceroutes is also
challenging: black-holes in traceroutes, whereby the routers do
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not respond to probes or when routers have a limit for ICMP
responses, are common in Internet [22].
[17] developed a methodology to passively detect spoofed
packets in traces recorded at a European IXP connecting 700
networks. The limitation of this approach is that it requires co-
operation of the IXP to perform the analysis over the traffic
and applies only to networks connected to the IXP. Allowing
to identify spoofing that defacto took place, the approach pro-
posed in [17] does not allow to run a targeted evaluation whether
some network in question filters spoofed traffic. Specifically,
this approach allows to identify networks that received packets
with spoofed IP addresses during the time period during which
the analysis was made. However, it misses out on the networks
which do not enforce filtering but which did not receive packets
from spoofed IP addresses (at least during the time frame in
which the traces were collected).
A range of studies analysed network traces for ingress filtering
using IP address characteristics [2, 7–9, 25], or by inspecting
on-path network equipment reaction to unwanted traffic, [30].
SMap. In contrast to previous studies, SMap enables remote
scan of entire Internet, improving the coverage and representa-
tiveness of the results. The studies of SMap can be reproduced
and validated by anyone, without requiring taking over control
of the vantage points. SMap, similarly to the Spoofer Project,
allows repeating the measurements periodically, and performing
longitudinal studies. However, in contrast to SMap, the datasets
of the Spoofer Project cannot be reproduced, unless the Spoofer
Project hands over the control over the software on the vantage
points. Similarly to SMap, the Open Resolver project allows any-
one to reproduce the measurement study but additionally needs
to provide the list of misconfigured or faulty servers for running
the study. See comparison in Table 1.
Finally, SMap uses a much more stable measurement infras-
tructure that the previous studies: if a server in the tested network
is moved to a different IP address, we can re-locate it either per-
forming a DNS lookup with the domain name or via an IP range
scan. Indeed, less than 1% of the networks during the half a year
measurement period because not available for measurements.
The Open Resolver and the Spoofer Projects [3, 23] can lose
control over volunteers or vantage points once these are patched,
reinstalled or moved to a different network.
3 Measurement Methodology
The measurement methodology underlying SMap uses active
probes, some sent from spoofed and some sent from real source
IP addresses, to popular services on the tested networks. The
spoofed source IP addresses belong to the tested networks (this is
similar to the Spoofer Project). The idea behind our methodology
is that if the packets with spoofed addresses reach the services
in tested networks, they trigger a certain action, which we can
measure remotely. We monitor the packets arriving from the
tested networks to our infrastructure to infer whether the tested
networks enforce ingress filtering. If the action was not triggered,
we conclude that spoofed packets did not reach the service. We
develop three techniques to detect if networks filter spoofed traf-
fic based on our methodology: DNS lookup, IPID and PMTUD
based. To ensure that our measurements apply to as many Internet
networks as possible, we devise measurement techniques using
popular and widely used services: DNS resolvers, Name servers,
Email servers and Web servers. The techniques leverage stan-
dard protocols’ behaviour and perform indirect measurements
of ingress filtering. The idea behind the IPID technique is to
identify whether spoofed packets increment the IPID counter on
a remote server on the tested network. The idea behind the DNS
lookup is to cause the tested network to issue a DNS request to
our Name servers. The idea behind the PMTUD technique is to
cause the server on the tested network to reduce the MTU to a
server on our network. The measurement infrastructure of SMap
with the servers that we use is illustrated in Figure 5.
In this section we present the methodology for using the popu-
lar services to measure ingress filtering in networks and explain
how we find the services with the properties needed for our
measurements.
3.1 DNS Lookup
Background. DNS provides lookup services to networks.
Upon receiving a DNS request, the resolver performs the lookup
of the requested domain name and returns the response with the
requested record.
Idea. We send a DNS request to the tested network from a
spoofed IP address belonging to the tested network. If the net-
work does not enforce ingress filtering, the request will arrive
at the DNS resolver on that network. A query from a spoofed
source IP address will cause the response to be sent to the IP
address from which the request was sent, i.e., the spoofed IP
address. Since we do not control the spoofed IP address, we will
not be able to observe this event and hence will not be able to in-
fer if the DNS resolver received our request or if the request was
filtered due to spoofing. To obtain insights into the traffic arriving
at the resolver in the tested network we utilise the payload of
the DNS request: the query contains the domain which we own,
set up on Name servers that we control. Namely, eventhough the
response from the DNS resolver will be returned to the spoofed
IP address and will not be received by us, the DNS request will
be issued to our Name servers, which is an indication that the
DNS resolver on the tested network received our DNS request,
sent from spoofed IP address.
Identifying DNS resolvers. The main challenge here is to lo-
cate the DNS resolvers within a domain/network and to trigger a
DNS request to our Name servers. We use Email service in the
target networks (retrieved via the MX type request in the target
domain) to find the DNS resolvers. We send an email to target
domain’s Email server from one of our unique subdomains with
a non-existing recipient set in the destination. This causes the
Email server on the tested network to generate a Delivery Sta-
tus Notification (DSN) error message [RFC3464] to our Email
server. To be able to send us the DSN, the Email server will re-
quest the resolver on the tested network, to provide it the MX and
A/AAAA records of our Email exchanger. At the same time, it
may also trigger anti-spam checking, which requests (SPF/TXT,
PTR, DKIM, DMARC)-type records in domains under our con-
trol. By monitoring the DNS queries at our Name servers, we
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collect the IP addresses of the resolvers. Using this methodology
we identified 49252 DNS resolvers in 7141 networks.
3.2 IPID
Background. Each IP packet contains an IP Identifier (IPID)
field, which is used to identify duplicate packets and for frag-
mentation. The IPID field is 16 bits in IPv4, and for each packet
the Operating System (OS) assigns a new IPID value. There are
different IPID assignment algorithms which can be categorised
as: random and predictable. Predictable category uses either a
global counter or multiple counters per designation IP address,
such that the counter is incremented in predictable quotes. Ran-
dom category selects each IPID value at random from a pool of
values.
Idea. In our measurement of ingress filtering with IPID tech-
nique we use services that assign globally incremental IPID val-
ues. The idea is that globally incremental IPID [RFC6864] [28]
values leak traffic volume arriving at the service and can be mea-
sured by any Internet host. [10] used a globally incremental IPID
for exchanging covert communication between two hosts, by en-
coding bits in traffic volume. We follow a similar idea to design
a technique for inferring ingress filtering. Given a server with a
globally incremental IPID on the tested network, we sample the
IPID value (send a packet to the server and receive a response)
from the IP addresses controlled by us. We then generate a set of
packets to the server from spoofed IP addresses, belonging to the
tested network. Then we probe the IPID value again, by sending
packets from our real IP address. If the spoofed packets reached
the server, they incremented the IPID counter on the server - an
event which we infer when probing the value from our real IP
address the second time.
As we show in Section 4.2, the traffic rates to servers can be
predicted. Hence the challenge here is to accurately probe the
increments rate of the IPID value (caused by packets from other
sources not controlled by us), in order to be able to extrapolate
the value that will have been assigned to our second probe from
a real source IP. This allows us to infer if the spoofed packets
incremented the IPID counter.
Measuring IPID increment rate. The traffic to the servers
is stable and hence can be predicted, [29]. We validate this by
sampling the IPID value at the servers which we use for running
the test. One example evaluation of IPID sampling on one of
the busiest servers is plotted in Figure 2. In this evaluation we
issued queries to a Name server at 69.13.54.XXX during three
minutes, and plot the IPID values received in responses in Figure
2 - the identical patterns demonstrate predictable increment rates.
Which means that the traffic to the server arrives at a stable rate.
Identifying servers with global IPID counters. We send
packets from two hosts (with different IP addresses) to a server
on a tested network. We implemented probing over TCP SYN,
ping and using requests/responses to Name servers and we apply
the suitable test depending on the server that we identify on the
tested network. If the responses contain globally incremental
IPID values - we use the service for ingress filtering measure-
ment with IPID technique. We located globally incremental IPID
in 37% of the measured networks. There are certainly more hosts
Figure 2: IPID of Name server 69.13.54.XXX during 180sec.
Figure 3: IPIDs on servers in dataset.
on networks that support globally incremental IPID values, yet
our goal was to validate our measurement techniques while keep-
ing the measurement traffic low - hence we avoided scanning the
networks for additional hosts and only checked for Web, Email
or Name servers with globally incremental IPID counters via
queries to the tested domain.
Statistics of IPID values distribution among tested servers are
plotted in Figure 3. When ICMP is filtered, it results in ERROR,
when run with TCP, the IPID values are often zero (i.e., ZERO
IPID in graph) in Figure 3. To improve coverage of the IPID
technique we merge the ICMP&TCP and ICMP&UDP results
for each server in our measurements.
3.3 PMTUD
Background. Path Maximum Transmission Unit Discovery
(PMTUD) determines the MTU size on the network path between
two IP hosts. The process starts by setting the Don’t Fragment
(DF) bit in IP headers. Any router along the path whose MTU
is smaller than the packet will drop the packet, and send back
an ICMP Fragmentation Needed / Packet Too Big (PTB). The
payload of the ICMP packet contains the IP header and the first 8
bytes of the original packet that triggered the error as well as the
MTU of the router that sent the ICMP message; see ICMP packet
format in Figure 4. After receiving an ICMP PTB message, the
source host should either reduce its path MTU appropriately or
unset the DF bit.
Idea. The of the PMTUD technique is to conceal the source IP
address of a prober on our infrastructure in the packet, and to send
the ICMP fragmentation needed packet from a spoofed source IP
address (belonging to a host on the tested network). Specifically,
we probe the MTU to a service on the tested network, then send
ICMP PTB from a spoofed IP address. If the packet arrives at
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Offsets Octet 0 1 2 3
Octet Bit 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
0 0 v4 IHL = 20 TOS Total Length = 56
4 32 IPID x DF MF Frag Offset
8 64 TTL Protocol = 1 IP Header Checksum
12 96 Source IP = 1.2.3.6
16 128 Destination IP = 1.2.3.7
20 160 Type = 3 Code = 4 ICMP Checksum
24 192 Unused MTU = 100
28 224 v4 IHL = 20 TOS Total Length = 76
32 256 IPID x DF MF Frag Offset
36 288 TTL Protocol = 17 IP Header Checksum
40 320 Source IP = 1.2.3.7
44 352 Destination IP = 7.7.7.7
48 384 Source Port = 53 Destination Port = 12345
52 416 Length = 56 UDP Checksum
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Figure 4: ICMP fragmentation needed packet from prober at
7.7.7.7 to server at 1.2.3.7 indicating an MTU of 100 bytes with
spoofed source IP
the service, it will reduce the MTU to our prober, and we will
identify this event in the next packet from the service - this event
implies that the tested network does not apply ingress filtering.
4 SMap
SMap architecture consists of two parts: dataset scan and ingress
filtering scan; see Figure 5. The dataset scan collects the popular
servers (DNS resolvers and Name/Email/Web servers) in the
tested networks. The ingress filtering scan is applied against
the servers collected by the dataset scan. In this section we
show the implementation of the measurement techniques that we
developed for measuring ingress filtering (based on IPID, DNS,
and PMTUD) and integrated into SMap.
Figure 5: Architecture of SMap.
4.1 Dataset Scan
We present two approaches for scanning for servers that we
implemented into SMap and discuss the differences between
them. We also show the output returned by the dataset scan.
Output. The task of the dataset scan is given a list of networks,
to produce and output a dataset that contains the servers against
which SMap will run periodic ingress filtering measurements.
The output list contains the following columns (for illustration
we also list two example rows) for every server in every network:
ASN; Domain; Service; IP address;
1234; a.com; DNS resolver; 1.2.3.5;
1234; c.net; name server; 1.2.3.8;
Collecting the servers. The output list can be created by scan-
ning the IPv4 range. Although this provides an optimal coverage
of the Internet it also creates a huge load of traffic on the Internet
as well as on the networks which need to be scanned to locate the
servers. Specifically, to locate the services SMap needs to send
probes to every IP, checking for open ports that correspond to the
services that we need; for instance, port 25 for Email, 53 for DNS,
80/443 for Web. Scans of IPv4 range are often performed, e.g.,
for measuring vulnerabilities or adoption of defences [11, 12],
and for measuring filtering of spoofed packets, e.g., [16, 23]. To
reduce the traffic load, we develop a domains-scan. In contrast
to IPv4 scan, domains-scan does not require scanning each IP
address on a network: identification of the needed servers can be
done by querying the DNS. Specifically, for every domain, we
query the IP and hostname of the services that we need: (A, MX)
for Email server, A for Web server, (A, NS) for name server.
We implemented IPv4 range scan and domains-scan into
SMap. The algorithms, describing the steps needed for collecting
the servers according to domains-scan and IPv4 scan are illus-
trated in Appendix, in Algorithms 1 and 2 respectively. Domain-
wide scan is performed from two cloud Virtual Private Servers
(VPS), both similarly configured: 1 dedicated physical CPU
thread, 512MB RAM and network connection at 20Mbit/Sec.
A single measurement can be completed in less than a day, how-
ever, in order to reduce the traffic load on the tested networks we
spread our measurement over a week.
Architecture. The dataset scan consists of the following
components: orchestrator, DNS resolver, EMail, and two name
servers: one authoritative for the test domain, the other for the
domain in reverse DNS tree; see Figure 5. The central compo-
nent is the orchestrator. It receives in an input a list of domains
or a list of networks in CIDR notation (e.g., entire IPv4 range),
uses the resolver to perform lookups of the (Web, Email, Name)
servers in the tested networks, and uses the Email server to locate
DNS resolvers in the tested networks and returns in an output
the list of services according to ASes, IPs, domains and network
blocks.
For instance, according to domains-scan, given a domain
example.net, the orchestrator asks the DNS resolver to lookup
A, MX of example.net for Email server, A, NS records of
example.net for Name server and A for www.example.net.
Then, it sends an Email to the MX server of example.net, and
monitors (using TCPdump) for SPF/TXT/PTR records arriving
from the tested network to Name servers on our SMap infrastruc-
ture (Name servers authoritative for our test domain and for the
reverse DNS domain of our IP address block); see Section 3 for
explanation. The orchestrator then collects the TCPdump from
the Name servers.
The orchestrator also uses an opt-out list to remove networks
from the scan that do not wish to be tested. The orchestrator
compiles a complete list of services, with the output described
above and provides it to the prober host(s) for running the ingress
filtering measurements.
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4.2 Ingress Filtering Scan
SMap consists of a measurement client (the web interface), which
controls two backend measurement prober hosts. The prober
hosts receive the dataset to be scanned from the orchestrator and
run IPID, PMTUD and DNS lookup tests against the servers
on the dataset list. Similarly to the Spoofer Project, [3], in each
network the spoofed packets are selected as the next neighbour
of the server. For instance, given a server at IP address 1.2.3.4
we select the next neighbour as 1.2.3.4/31, namely 1.2.3.5,
which is the IP address that we will be spoofing in the tests
involving the server at 1.2.3.4.
Input: dataset
for each AS in dataset
if ((DNS-lookup == 1) || (IPID == 1) || (PMTUD == 1)):
AS not-filtering
SMap applies one test at a time for each tested AS. If the
test succeeds, i.e., the AS does not perform filtering of spoofed
packets, SMap moves to the next AS. Otherwise, if the test does
not indicate that the AS applies ingress filtering (e.g., the network
cannot be tested with that test since there is no corresponding
service, or if the result does not indicate support of filtering),
then SMap moves to the next test.
In our measurements in Section 5 we performed all three tests
for each AS, in order to compare the success and applicability of
each technique. In actual measurements for ingress filtering, to
improve performance, one successful test suffices. The results
from the tests are stored in the backend database and runs analy-
ses over it. The GUI displays the results of the measurements that
were performed and allows scanning new networks for ingress
filtering; see http://to_be_revealed/. We next present each
technique.
IPID. We build a measurement technique using an IPID side
channel. The idea is to use a server with a globally incremental
IPID counter, and to check if packets from spoofed IP address
to that server increment the counter. The components used by
this tool are: the prober at IP address 7.7.7.7 and a server at IP
address 1.2.3.7 that uses globally incremental IPID, illustrated
in Figure 6. Using the prober at 7.7.7.7, we measure the value
of the IPID and the rate at which IPID increments. As we showed,
the traffic volumes to the servers in the Internet is stable and
hence can be predicted.
For this, we send N probes to 7.7.7.7 (in step (1) in Figure
6). Let the IPID value in the response to the first probe be X and
in each subsequent response i (0 < i < N) the IPID value is X +
i+ f , where f is a function of the additional traffic that the server
receives from other sources. If the IPID value in Nth response is
Y = X +N+ f , then the server is using globally incremental IPID
assignment. Repeating this process also allows us to estimate f .
Once we establish the rate f at which the traffic is arriving and
the current IPID value, we test if the network performs ingress
filtering. Specifically, in step (3) in Figure 6, we send a set of M
packets from a spoofed source IP address 1.2.3.6 (belonging
to the probed network). In step (4) we sample the IPID value
from the server from the prober’s real IP address 7.7.7.7 -
this is needed in order to receive the response. We check the
IPID value Z in step (5) in Figure 6. If the counter incremented
proportionally to the number of packets sent (Z = Y +M + f )
then there is no ingress filtering, since packets from a spoofed IP
address belonging to the network increment the counter.
Figure 6: Sequence diagram for test with IPID technique.
As an example consider the following simplified algorithm for
inferring the IPID rate and value with fixed number of probes (the
generalised case is straightforward). We send probes to the server
and record the corresponding time T and IPID values. As IPID
is an unsigned 16-bit integer, we define ∆IPIDi = (IPIDi+1−
IPIDi + 216)%216, i = 1,2,3,4. After we have sent 4 requests
to the server: 1st&3rd from prober1 and 2nd&4th from prober2,
we will see if the Server is using globally sequential IPID, by
checking ∆IPIDi ≤ 1000, i = 1,2,3. If it has globally sequential
IPID, we spoof 10 packets with server’s neighbour IP1 as source
IP and send 5th request from prober1. We then use the following
calculation to estimate the average IPID rate and check if it was
incremented by our spoofed packets:
∆Ti = Ti+1−Ti, i = 1,2,3,4
SPD =
(∆IPID1
∆T1
+
∆IPID2
∆T2
+
∆IPID3
∆T3
)
/3
∆IPID4 ≥ SPD∗∆T4 +8
We define outcomes of a test with IPID technique as spoofable,
applicable, non-applicable, N/A; see Table 2. The IPID technique
is not applicable if the IPID counter is constant zero or if the
IPID counter is not globally incremental.
Path MTU Discovery (PMTUD). The core idea of the tool is
to send the ICMP PTB message from a spoofed source IP address,
belonging to the tested network, and in the 8 bytes payload of
the ICMP to insert the real IP address belonging to the prober.
If the network does not enforce ingress filtering, the server will
receive the PMTUD message and will reduce the MTU to the IP
address specified in the first 8 bytes of the ICMP payload.
We identified networks that support PMTUD (i.e., do not fil-
ter ICMP Fragmentation Needed (Type 3, Code 4) messages).
This constitutes 30.42% of the tested networks.The PMTUD
1Neighbour means (IP xor 1), either IP+1 or IP-1.
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Category IPID Technique PMTUD Technique
Spoofable no filtering no filtering
Applicable
server w/globally
incremental IPID
host supports
PMTUD
Non-Applicable
random IPID
or per-dest IPID
or IPID=0
(DF≡0 & MF≡0) or
(DF≡1 or MF≡1) &
no change
N/A
host unreachable
or firewall
or packet loss
or load balancer
host unreachable or
misconfigured service
or firewall
or packet loss
Table 2: Outcomes of tests with IPID and PMTUD techniques.
Figure 7: Sequence diagram for test with PMTUD technique.
test is illustrated in Figure 7. We establish a TCP connection
to a server on the tested network. Then we send Request1 and
receive Response1. If DF bit is not set, the server does not sup-
port PMTUD. Otherwise, we send an ICMP PTB with smaller
MTU. Following that, we request again and get Response2. If
DF1 == 1 and (DF2 == 0 or size2 ≤ size1), server supports PM-
TUD. Now we can proceed to test if ingress filtering is enforced.
We spoof an ICMP PTB with smallest MTU, using server’s
neighbour IP as source IP address. Once that is done, we make
another request. The server is not protected by ingress filtering if
following condition applies:
size3 ≤ size2 or (DF2 == 1 and DF3 == 0)
We define outcomes of a test with PMTUD technique as
spoofable, applicable, non-applicable, N/A; see rightmost col-
umn in Table 2.
Figure 8: Sequence diagram for test with DNS lookup technique.
DNS lookup. Given a DNS resolver at IP 1.2.3.7, we send
a DNS query to 1.2.3.7 port 53 asking for a record in domain
under our control. The query is sent from a spoofed source IP
address belonging to the tested network. We monitor for DNS
requests arriving at our Name server. If a query for the requested
record arrives from 1.2.3.7, we mark the network as not en-
forcing ingress filtering. The process is illustrated in Figure 8,
steps (1-4) locate the IP address of the DNS resolver, and steps
(5,6) test for ingress filtering on that network.
5 Measurement Evaluations
In this section we report on domain-wide measurement of ingress
filtering with SMap. Our dataset collection with SMap has been
initiated on July 2019. Our latest measurement covers over 3M
domains. We collect the most popular services according to
top-1M Alexa domains, CISCO umbrella, and other popular
services, merged together while removing duplicates. After the
dataset scan, we found 310415 Name servers in 21192 ASes,
494079 Email servers in 21971 ASes, and 861927 Web servers
in 20840 ASes; see Table 4. The the data of the ingress filtering
measurements with SMap is summarised in Table 3.
Our measurements covered more than 3M domains, whose
services were hosted in 30563 ASes; see Table 3. The techniques
that we integrated into SMap (IPID, PMTUD, DNS lookup) were
found applicable to more than 82% of the measured ASes. Us-
ing SMap we identified 47.56% of the ASes that do not enforce
ingress filtering. For comparison, in Appendix, Table 6 we pro-
vide data analysis according to domains (instead of ASes as in
Table 3). Not surprisingly the applicability of our techniques is
much higher, i.e., more than 90%, since domains have at least
one publicly available service, typically name server.
In what follows we compare the effectiveness of the tech-
niques, explain causes for false negatives and failures.
5.1 Applicability and Success
As can be seen in Table 3 the most applicable technique is DNS
lookup, which applied to 72% of the ASes we measured, yet tests
with DNS lookup identified only 30% of the ASes as spoofable.
In contrast, a test against Web servers with PMTUD technique,
which applied to a bit more than 50% of the ASes, yielded the
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#Technique_Server Spoofable Applicable Non-
Applicable
N/A Total
IPID_NS 3622 17.50% 5344 25.82% 15356 9863 30563
IPID_MX 4292 22.55% 6427 33.77% 12606 11530 30563
IPID_WWW 3145 16.95% 5013 27.01% 13547 12003 30563
IPID_ANY 7283 25.50% 10569 37.00% 17997 1997 30563
PMTUD_NS 2313 14.16% 3289 20.14% 13045 14229 30563
PMTUD_MX 945 29.81% 1941 61.23% 1229 27393 30563
PMTUD_WWW 1829 38.69% 2380 50.35% 2347 25836 30563
PMTUD_ANY 3745 20.92% 5445 30.42% 12455 12663 30563
DNS lookup 9242 30.24% 21989 71.95% - - 30563
ANY 13780 47.56% 23950 82.66% 5023 1590 30563
Table 3: Collected data and analysis per AS view.
Name
Server
Email
Server
Web
Server
#IPs 310415 494079 861927
#ASes 21192 21971 20840
Table 4: Servers in tested networks.
highest fraction of spoofable ASes. This is not surprising, since
it is expected that firewalls would block port 53 from the Internet
to the IP address of the resolver, making the test appear as “not
successful” even if the firewalls do not actually defacto apply
ingress filtering, while it is recommended not to block ICMP
to Web servers to allow for path MTU discovery. In Appendix,
Table 6 we list measurement results according to domains - also
here the most applicable test is via DNS lookup technique and
PMTUD technique against Web servers yielded the highest num-
ber of spoofable networks. In Appendix, Figures 14 and 15 we
plot the correlation between ASes and domains - essentially the
graphs show that domains are typically hosted on more than one
AS and ASes host multiple domains.
We next compare the success and applicability of tests with
PMTUD and IPID techniques against Email, Name and Web
servers. In order to compare the effectiveness of the PMTUD
and IPID measurement techniques as well as their applicability,
we define the spoofable and testable rates, as follows:
Ratespoo f =
Nspoo f able
Ntotal−NNA
Ratetest =
Ntestable
Ntotal−NNA
The spoofable rate reflects the fraction of networks found not to
apply ingress filtering and the testable rate means applicability
of the test technique.
In Figure 9 we plot the coverage of each of the three tech-
niques for different types of servers (Web, Name, and Email).
Figure 9 shows that DNS-lookup technique (listed as “DNS” in
Figure 9) has a better test rate than either of the IPID and PM-
TUD tests. Between the other two, PMTUD test has a much
higher applicability (test rate) than IPID test, which indicates
that PMTUD is more supported than globally sequential IPID.
Even though PMTUD test applies to more networks than IPID
test, IPID test reports more networks as spoofable. Especially
Figure 9: Coverage of the measurement techniques.
when we consider the hit rate Nspoo f ableNtestable , IPID test has over 50%,
which is much higher than the other two tests. An interesting
finding is that over half of the networks which have a Name
server with globally sequential IPID counter are vulnerable to IP
spoofing.
In general, tests against Name servers have a higher applica-
bility rate than the tests with Email or Web servers, regardless
of which technique was used (IPID or PMTUD). The reason is
twofold: first, every domain has at least one Name server while it
is not guaranteed that each domain has a Web or an Email server.
Second, DNS is a fundamental protocol that any user and service
on the Internet needs, in order to locate other services. Indeed,
almost all the networks where tests against Name servers were
applicable, but against Email or Web not, it was due to the fact
that the network did not operate Email/Web servers. To test this,
we select a random sample of networks, among those in which
the tests against Email and Web did not apply but against Name
server applied; a scan shows that ports 80/443 and 25 on those
networks are not open. Furthermore, we find that when a Name
server is not available (“N/A”), both Email and Web servers
cannot be tested, either. This also results in much higher N/A
outcomes for tests against Email and Web servers as opposed to
Name servers.
The higher applicability of the tests against Name servers
also correlates with a higher number of spoofable networks. In
Appendix, Figures 16 and 17, we show the relationships between
the applicability of SMap measurement techniques to different
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services and the overlap between them.
Figure 10: Comparison of spoofability found via IPID and PM-
TUD.
5.2 Errors
We define the result of SMap evaluation successful (i.e., true
positive) if at least one of the three tests outputs that the tested
network does not filter spoofed packets: either the IPID value
on the server in the tested network was incremented as expected
(IPID test) or we receive a query at our domain (DNS test) or
the server on the tested network reduced the MTU of the packets
sent to us (PMTUD test). When either of the three techniques
provides a positive result, we mark the network as not filtering.
SMap does not make mistakes when reporting a network as
not filtering. However, it can have false negatives: when the scan
does not report network as not filtering when a network does not
filter spoofed packets.
5.2.1 No False Positives
Our techniques are not susceptible to false positives, that is, clas-
sification of the tested network as filtering spoofed packets when
in fact it does not do so. This is a side effect of our methodol-
ogy - only when spoofing is not filtered will the “test action” be
triggered.
IPID technique. When spoofing is not filtered the counter on
the server will be incremented - which is the test action. At the
probing phase the counter’s value will equal or large than the
expected value after the increment phase. The GPS encoding and
repeated measurements ensure that we do not accidentally inter-
pret noise (i.e., packets from other sources to the same server) as
lack of ingress filtering.
DNS technique. When spoofing is not filtered the DNS re-
solver on the tested network will receive a DNS request from a
spoofed IP address to our domain. Hence a query at our domain
is the test action that spoofed packets are not filtered.
PMTUD technique. Reduction of the MTU of the packets
sent from the test server to our network is the action which
indicates that spoofing filtering is not enforced.
5.2.2 False Negatives
False negatives in our measurements mean that a network that
does not perform filtering of spoofed packets is not marked
as such. We next list the causes of false negatives for each of
our three techniques. Essentially the false negatives cannot be
resolved, and therefore our measurement results of networks
that enforce ingress filtering introduce a a lower bound. The
networks that we classify as those that do not apply ingress
filtering - definitely allow packets from spoofed IP addresses
into the network. The networks which were not classified as “not
enforcing ingress filtering”, could still be “not enforcing ingress
filtering”, but this cannot be determined using our techniques.
IPID technique. Load balancing can introduce a challenge in
identifying whether a given network enforces ingress filtering.
As a result of load balancing our packets will be split between
multiple instances of the server, hence resulting in low IPID
counter values. There are different approaches for distributing
the load to different instances, e.g., random or round robin, which
makes it impossible to identify whether a “load-balanced-server”
is on a network which applies ingress filtering or not.
Anycasted server instances can also introduce a challenge in
inferring ingress filtering enforcement. We identified such cases
by performing traceroutes to the server.
DNS technique. Firewalls, blocking incoming packets on port
53, would as a result generate a similar effect as ingress filtering
on our servers: we would not receive any DNS requests to our
domain. However, such a setting does not indicate that the tested
network actually performs ingress filtering.
PMTUD technique. Firewalls are often configured to block
ICMP packets. In such case the evaluation result is similar as
when a tested network does not enforce ingress filtering: our
PMTUD packets will be blocked by the firewall, but not because
they originate from an IP address that belongs to the tested
network but because the firewall blocks ICMP packets. This case
can be identified by sending ICMP PMTUD packets from an IP
address that does not belong to the network. If the ICMP packets
are not blocked (but were blocked when the packets were sent
from a spoofed IP address) then the network does not block
ICMP packets and does enforce IP spoofing filtering. On the
other hand if the packets are blocked then one cannot determine
if the blocking is done because of ICMP or because of filtering
of spoofed IP addresses.
5.2.3 Improving Accuracy
The accuracy of the measurements with SMap can be improved
by identifying more servers to which our techniques apply, this
however requires generating more traffic. Specifically, in this
work our goal is to evaluate the effectiveness of domains-scan
by resolving the MX, NS and A records (that correspond to
Email, Name and Web servers) and to run the tests against them,
providing a lower bound on the effectiveness of our proposal,
while keeping the traffic low. Nevertheless, in every AS there are
typically multiple hosts which operate (Web, Email or Name)
servers on ports 80/443, 25 and 53, in addition to the services that
appear in the zonefile of the domain. To identify more servers, a
scan of the AS for ports 53, 25 and 80/443 is required.
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5.3 Comparison with Other Measurements
To understand the effectiveness of our methodologies we com-
pare the results of our measurements with the active measure-
ments of ingress filtering performed by the CAIDA Spoofer
Project. These are two types of measurements: using traceroute
and using agents. The spoofer project is the only measurement
study that makes the datasets from their scans available online.
The traceroute approach and the agents approach are the only two
other active measurements of enforcement of ingress filtering
(see Related Work Section 2). We crawled all the 217917 session
reports in 2019 of CAIDA Spoofer Project. These included 2867
ASes with Spoofer Project agents, and 2500 ASes with Spoofer
Project traceroute loops (total of 5367 ASes). Using our method-
ologies we measured 30563 ASes. We covered 469% more ASes
than the traceroute and agents approaches together. We compare
between our results and the other two methodologies below.
5.3.1 Traceroute Active Measurements
We analyse the datasets from the traceroute measurements per-
formed by the CAIDA Spoofer Project within the last year
2019, [19]. The measurements identified 2,500 unique loops,
of these 703 were provider ASes, and 1780 customer ASes. The
dataset found 688 ASes that do not enforce ingress filtering. Out
of 688 ASes found with traceroutes by the Spoofer Project, we
could not test 116 ASes (none of our tests applied) and 77 ASes
were not included in our tests (those ASes could not be located
from domain names - due to our attempt to reduce traffic and not
to scan IPv4 but to collect the services via domain names). The
rest of the ASes agree with our measurement results.
5.3.2 Agents Active Measurements
Agents with active probes found 608 ASes that were found not
to be enforcing ingress filtering using the agents approach of
the Spoofer Project (these include duplicates with the traceroute
loops measurements). Those contain some of the duplicates
from traceroute measurements: together both approaches of the
Spoofer Project found 1113 ASes to be spoofable. Out of those
we could not test 110 ASes, the rest were also identified by our
tests.
Although the agents provide the optimal setup for testing fil-
tering, with control over the packets that can be crafted and sent
from both sides, as we explain in Related Work Section 2, this
approach is limited only to networks that deploy agents on their
networks. In contrast, SMap provides better coverage since it
is potentially applicable to every network that has one of the
services that are required in our tests.
In total, our results identified 13780 ASes to be spoofable,
which is more than 45% of the ASes that we tested. This also
13780 - 1113 = 12667 ASes more than both the traceroute and
the agents approaches found.
These findings show that SMap offers benefits over the ex-
isting methods, providing better coverage of the ASes in the
Internet and not requiring agents or conditions for obtaining
traceroute loops, hence improving visibility of networks not en-
forcing ingress filtering.
6 Networks Analysis
In order to understand if there are differences in enforcement of
ingress filtering between different network types and different
countries, we perform characterisation of the networks that we
found to not be filtering spoofed packets. Specifically, we ask
the following questions: Does business type of networks or geo-
location of networks influence filtering of spoofed packets?
To derive the geo-location of ASes we used NetAcuity geo-
ip database. The results are listed in Table 5. The tested ASes
are distributed across different countries, with most ASes being
in large countries, like US and Russia. The ration of spoofable
ASes ranges between 32% and 54%, with Russia leading with
the fraction of spoofable networks, with 54%.
Country Tested
ASes
Spoofable
ASes
Spoofable
Ratio
US 8246 3383 41.03%
RU 3319 1792 53.99%
DE 1219 552 45.28%
UA 1074 566 52.70%
GB 1004 472 47.01%
BR 1002 460 45.91%
CA 812 425 52.34%
PL 794 350 44.08%
AU 734 241 32.83%
FR 716 335 46.79%
ID 713 332 46.56%
NL 632 295 46.68%
IN 605 196 32.40%
IT 488 216 44.26%
KR 448 176 39.29%
RO 424 193 45.52%
CH 419 185 44.15%
JP 415 208 50.12%
ES 373 184 49.33%
TR 365 149 40.82%
Table 5: Top-20 Countries with most tested ASes.
We also want to understand the types of networks that we could
test via domains-wide scans. To derive the business types we use
the PeeringDB. We classify the ASes according to the following
business types: content, enterprise, Network Service Provider
(NSP), Cable/DSL/ISP, non-profit, educational/research, route
server at Internet Exchange Point (IXP)2 We plot the networks
that do not enforce ingress filtering according to business types
in Figure 11. According to our study enterprise and non-profit
networks enforce ingress filtering more than other networks. In
contrast, NSPs contain the most networks that do not enforce
ingress filtering.
There is a strong correlation between the AS size and the
enforcement of spoofing, see Figure 12. Essentially, the larger
the AS, the higher the probability that our tools identify that it
does not filter spoofed packets. The reason can be directly related
to our methodologies and the design of our study: the larger the
2A route server directs traffic among Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) routers.
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Figure 11: Spoofable ratio across ASes’ types. AS type is queried
from PeeringDB.
network the more services it hosts. This means that we have more
possibilities to test if spoofing is possible: for instance, we can
identify a higher fraction of servers with a globally incremental
IPID counters, which are not “load balanced”. In Figure 13 we
plot the statistics of the tested networks according to their size
and type. The results show a correlation between the size of the
network and its type. For instance, most NSP networks are large,
with CIDR/6. This is aligned with our finding that among NSP
networks there was the highest number of spoofable networks. In
Appendix, we plot the fraction of spoofable networks according
to networks’ sizes for each network type separately, i.e., for
DSL/ISP in Figure 20, for NSP in Figure 21, for enterprises
in Figure 22, for content providers in Figure 23, for research
organisations in Figure 24, for non-profit organisations in Figure
25, and for route server networks in Figure 26.
Figure 12: Spoofable ratio according to networks’ sizes. Network
size is calculated from GeoLite2-ASN database.
7 Conclusions
We showed that coverage of Internet with ingress filtering mea-
surements can be substantially improved to include many more
ASes that were previously not possible to study. We designed the
first Spoofing Mapper (SMap) scanner, which enables Internet-
scale studies of ingress filtering, and applied it on ASes hosting
services in popular domains. Our study covered 46.5% of the
Internet ASes, in contrast to best coverage so far of 7.9% ASes
performed by the Spoofer Project. This coverage can be further
improved by scanning the IPv4 range. In this work our goal was
Figure 13: Distribution of networks’ sizes vs types.
to explore: given the minimal fraction of traffic generated, what
is the lower bound on coverage and accuracy that can be achieved.
In DNS looup and PMTUD tests the traffic volume that we gener-
ate is similar to that of the Spoofer Project (which generates the
least traffic in comparison to the other active measurements). The
traffic that IPID technique requires is proportional to the traffic
volume that the server in the tested network receives. Neverthe-
less, even with the minimal traffic volume that we produce, the
effectiveness of SMap is higher than those of previous studies: a
comparative analysis of our results with the datasets published
by the other tools showed that we found new ASes which were
not previously identified as not filtering spoofed traffic. SMap
also uses a much more stable infrastructure than the other studies
which enables running more accurate longitudinal studies: for
instance, since July 2019 less than 1% of periodically tested
ASes became N/A.
SMap performs active measurements in a black-box manner
and can study any TCP/IP network with standard and widely
supported services. SMap currently supports three techniques for
testing ingress filtering: DNS-based, IPID-based and PMTUD-
based. Our experimental comparison of the effectiveness of the
techniques demonstrated that DNS-based technique has a wider
applicability rate on networks that operate DNS resolvers than
the other two techniques, while the detection of the spoofability
of networks is more accurate with PMTUD. We show that the
measurements performed by SMap provide a lower bound on
the networks that do not enforce ingress filtering. Improving the
accuracy of SMap measurements can be done in two ways:
Increasing the traffic volume. To reduce or completely elim-
inate false negatives future research is needed to devise new
techniques or extend our techniques to resolve the limitations
imposed by, e.g., blocking of ICMP or load balancing.
Extending SMap with more techniques. The design of
SMap is modular to allow for easy integration of new measure-
ment techniques.
We provide online access to SMap at http://to_be_
revealed/, with publicly available datasets that we collect statis-
tics about ingress filtering that we measured.
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A Tables and Graphs
Algorithm 1: Domain-based Dataset Scan
Input: List: Domain
Input: Opt-Out List: Domain or IP or CIDR
Output: List: (AS, Domain, IP, Service)
initialise AS-list;
for each domain do
if domain in Opt-Out then
stop and go to next domain;
end
/* STEP 1: locate servers via DNS */
query NS/MX/A RR for domain;
mark (IP, Service);
/* STEP 2: trigger DNS queries */
send email to admin and nobody @domain;
/* STEP 3: sniff DNS queries */
log DNS queries at name server;
/* STEP 4: locate resolvers */
fetch DNS log and mark resolver IPs;
/* update AS info */
for each IP do
if IP in Opt-Out then
stop and go to next IP;
end
get AS info from GeoLite2-ASN database;
update (AS, Domain, Service, IP) in AS-list;
end
end
Algorithm 2: IPv4-based Dataset Scan
Input: List: IP
Input: Opt-Out List: Domain or IP or CIDR
Output: List: (AS, Domain, IP, Service)
initialise AS-list;
for each IP do
if IP in Opt-Out then
stop and go to next IP;
end
scan open ports for services;
if no DNS/Mail/Web server then
stop and go to next IP;
end
query hostname in reverse DNS;
extract domain from hostname;
if domain in Opt-Out then
stop and go to next IP;
end
get AS info from GeoLite2-ASN database;
for each service do
update (AS, Domain, Service, IP) in AS-list;
end
end
Figure 14: Fraction of ASes hosting multiple domains. How
many different domains are hosted on one AS: 80% of the ASes
hosting more than 20 domains.
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#Technique_Server Spoofable Applicable Non-
Applicable
N/A Total
IPID_NS 74846 2.57% 116582 4.01% 2790198 319901 3226681
IPID_MX 45838 1.99% 104093 4.53% 2195247 927341 3226681
IPID_WWW 25052 0.92% 49963 1.83% 2680014 496704 3226681
IPID_ANY 129276 4.02% 234343 7.29% 2980142 12196 3226681
PMTUD_NS 208741 7.84% 448400 16.83% 2215320 562961 3226681
PMTUD_MX 78842 10.10% 114626 14.69% 665872 2446183 3226681
PMTUD_WWW 213179 22.43% 318504 33.51% 631842 2276335 3226681
PMTUD_ANY 474557 16.04% 820093 27.71% 2139211 267377 3226681
DNS 266484 8.26% 2915436 90.35% - - 3226681
Table 6: Collected data and analysis per Domain view.
Figure 15: Fraction of domains hosting hosted in multiple ASes.
In other words: how many ASes host services of one domain:
50% of domains are hosted in two or more ASes.
Figure 16: Number of applicable ASes by difference service type
(Name Server and Resolver merged).
Figure 17: Number of Spoofable ASes by difference service type
(Name Server and Resolver merged).
Figure 18: Number of applicable ASes by difference technique.
Figure 19: Number of Spoofable ASes by difference technique.
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Figure 20: Spoofable ratio for Cable/DSL/ISP organisations ac-
cording to AS sizes.
Figure 21: Spoofable ratio for NSP organisations according to
AS sizes.
Figure 22: Spoofable ratio for Enterprise organisations according
to AS sizes.
Figure 23: Spoofable ratio for Content organisations according
to AS sizes.
Figure 24: Spoofable ratio for research organisations according
to AS sizes.
Figure 25: Spoofable ratio for non-profit organisations according
to AS sizes.
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Figure 26: Spoofable ratio for route server organisations accord-
ing to AS sizes.
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